The paper shows that the difference in aggregate volatility risk can explain why several anomalies are stronger among the stocks with low institutional ownership (IO). Because of their desire to hedge against aggregate volatility or to exploit their competitive advantage in obtaining and processing information, coupled with the dislike of uncertainty and volatility, institutions tend to stay away from the stocks with extremely low and extremely high levels of firm-specific uncertainty and growth options. Consequentially, the spread in the measures of uncertainty and growth options is wider for low IO stocks, and the same is true about the differential in aggregate volatility risk. I demonstrate empirically that the ICAPM with the aggregate volatility risk factor can completely explain why the negative relation between market-to-book, idiosyncratic volatility, turnover, and analyst disagreement, on the one hand, and future returns on the other is stronger for the stocks with low IO. The same mechanism explains why the positive relation between IO and future returns is stronger for growth firms and high uncertainty firms.
Introduction
Institutional ownership (henceforth IO) is long recognized to be driven by a long list of firm characteristics 1 , many of which can proxy for systematic risk. However, the existing asset pricing studies usually use IO as a proxy for either investor sophistication 2 or short sale constraints 3 . Therefore, the link between IO and numerous anomalies is usually interpreted as the evidence that these anomalies stem from investors' data-processing biases and persist because of limits to arbitrage.
This paper presents a risk-based story that explains why several important anomalies -the value effect (Fama and French, 1993) , the idiosyncratic volatility discount (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006), the turnover effect (Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe, 1998), and the analyst disagreement effect (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina, 2002) -are stronger for low IO firms. The explanation is aggregate volatility risk: in the subsample with low IO, the arbitrage portfolios that exploit the aforementioned anomalies severely underperform the CAPM when expected aggregate volatility increases.
The reason why the sorts on market-to-book, idiosyncratic volatility, turnover, or analyst disagreement produce wider aggregate volatility risk differential in the low IO subsample is that, as I document in this paper, institutions tend to stay away from the firms with extreme levels of volatility/uncertainty and growth options. On the one hand, portfolio managers dislike the stocks with high volatility/uncertainty (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) , which makes them decide against owning stocks with high market-to-book, high idiosyncratic volatility, high analyst disagreement, or high turnover. On the other hand, portfolio managers like the protection against aggregate volatility risk offered by the stocks with high levels of volatility and growth options 4 . Portfolio managers also recognize that they need some level of uncertainty to use their comparative advantage in access to information and in ability to process it. As a result, institutions ignore both the firms with low uncertainty (considering them unattractive) and the firms with high uncertainty (con-1 See, for example, Falkenstein (1996) , Del Guercio (1996) , Gompers 4 See Barinov (2009a) for the evidence that growth firms and high idiosyncratic volatility firm load negatively on the aggregate volatility risk factor, and Barinov (2009b) and Barinov (2009c) for similar evidence on high turnover firms and firm with high analyst forecast dispersion.
sidering them too dangerous). Sorting on uncertainty measures in the low IO subsample therefore produces the widest spreads in uncertainty. Barinov (2009a) shows that higher idiosyncratic volatility and abundant growth options mean lower aggregate volatility risk. First, idiosyncratic volatility increases when aggregate volatility goes up (see Campbell et al., 2001 , for empirical evidence). Higher idiosyncratic volatility during periods of high aggregate volatility means that the value of growth options becomes less sensitive to the value of the underlying asset (because the delta of the option declines in volatility) and the growth options become therefore less risky precisely when risks are high. This effect is stronger for the firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility. Hence, firms with high idiosyncratic volatility and valuable growth options will have procyclical market betas and will suffer smaller losses when aggregate volatility increases and the risk and expected returns of all firms go up.
Second, all else equal, growth options increase in value when idiosyncratic volatility of the underlying asset increases (see Grullon, Lyandres, and Zhdanov, 2007 , for empirical evidence). That makes the reaction of growth options to the increases of aggregate volatility (usually coupled with increases in idiosyncratic volatility) less negative. This effect is also stronger for high idiosyncratic volatility firms, therefore high idiosyncratic volatility firms, especially if they possess valuable growth options, tend to lose less value than other firms with similar market betas when aggregate volatility and idiosyncratic volatility both increase.
The fact that both the stocks with the lowest and the highest idiosyncratic volatility and market-to-book end up in the low IO subsample means that the sorts on idiosyncratic volatility (market-to-book) in this subsample will create the largest spread in idiosyncratic volatility (market-to-book) and, consequentially, the largest spread in exposure to aggregate volatility risk. Hence, the stronger idiosyncratic volatility discount and the stronger value effect for the lowest IO firms should be explained by aggregate volatility risk. The same should be true about the turnover effect and the analyst disagreement effect, because both turnover and analyst forecast dispersion are strongly correlated with idiosyncratic volatility.
Aggregate volatility risk is the risk of losing value when expected aggregate volatil-ity unexpectedly increases. Campbell (1993) creates a model where increasing aggregate volatility is synonymous with decreasing expected future consumption. Investors would require a lower risk premium from the stocks the value of which correlates positively with aggregate volatility news, because these stocks provide additional consumption precisely when investors have to cut their current consumption for consumption-smoothing and precautionary savings motives. Chen (2002) adds in the precautionary savings motive and concludes that the positive correlation of asset returns with aggregate volatility changes is desirable, because such assets deliver additional consumption when investors have to consume less in order to boost precautionary savings. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) confirm this prediction empirically and coin the notion of aggregate volatility risk. They show that the stocks with the most positive sensitivity to aggregate volatility increases have abnormally low expected returns and that the portfolio tracking expected aggregate volatility earns a significant risk premium. This paper builds on this literature and shows that aggregate volatility risk helps to explain the link between IO and several asset pricing anomalies.
I start my empirical tests by demonstrating that institutional investors indeed tend
to ignore the stocks with the extreme levels of market-to-book, idiosyncratic volatility, turnover, and analyst disagreement. In cross-sectional regressions, the sign of the relation between IO and these variables is positive when their values are low and becomes negative when their values become higher. I confirm this result using double sorts on market-to-book and IO and double sorts on idiosyncratic volatility and IO, which demonstrate that in the market-to-book (idiosyncratic volatility) sorts the spread in market-to-book (idiosyncratic volatility) is significantly larger if this sort is performed in the lower IO group. The same is true about aggregate volatility risk: buying value and shorting growth, as well as buying low and shorting high idiosyncratic volatility firms means greater exposure to aggregate volatility risk if one follows these strategies in the lower IO subsample.
I proceed with demonstrating that the difference in aggregate volatility risk is enough to explain why the value effect, the idiosyncratic volatility discount, the turnover effect, and the analyst disagreement effect are stronger for the firms with low IO. When I look at the CAPM alphas, the difference in the magnitude of these four effects between the lowest and the highest IO quintiles varies between 0.5% and 1% per month. However, in the two-factor ICAPM with the market factor and the aggregate volatility risk factor this difference is reduced by more than a half and usually becomes insignificant.
Next, I turn to explaining the positive link between IO and future returns. Gompers and Metrick (2001) is one of the first studies to document this link. They interpret the ability of IO to predict future returns either to the ability of the portfolio managers to pick the right stocks, or to the demand pressure institutions exert on prices. Yan and Zhang (2008) and Jiao and Liu (2008) show that the effect of IO on prices is higher for small stocks, growth stocks, and high uncertainty stocks, consistent with the argument in Gompers and Metrick (2001) .
The evidence in Yan and Zhang (2008) and Jiao and Liu (2008) can be potentially explained by aggregate volatility risk. As I show in this paper, in the subsamples with high (low) uncertainty institutions tend to pick the firms with lower (higher) uncertainty and therefore with higher (lower) aggregate volatility risk. Hence, my story also predicts that the relation between IO and future returns should be the most positive for high uncertainty firms.
Since the relation between IO and aggregate volatility risk should have different sign for high and low uncertainty firms, it is an empirical question what is the correlation between IO and aggregate volatility risk on average for all firms. The results of cross-sectional regressions suggest that, holding all else equal and not controlling for the concavity of the relation between IO and uncertainty, on average lower uncertainty means higher IO, and consequentially, higher IO implies higher aggregate volatility risk.
In the asset pricing tests I find that the two-factor ICAPM with the market factor and the aggregate volatility risk factor can explain the positive relation between IO and future returns, as well as why this relation is stronger if market-to-book or volatility/uncertainty measures are high.
I also perform two important robustness checks for all results discussed above. First, I replace my aggregate volatility factor by the change in expected aggregate volatility (as proxied for by the change in the VIX index), which is the variable mimicked by the aggregate volatility factor. Using the change in VIX I show that during increases in expected aggregate volatility the arbitrage portfolios exploiting the value effect, the idiosyncratic volatility discount, the turnover effect, and the analyst disagreement effect indeed underperform the CAPM more severely, if these arbitrage portfolios are formed in the low IO subsample. I also demonstrate that, on average, low (high) IO firms tend to beat (trail) the CAPM when expected aggregate volatility increases, and this is especially true in the subsamples of growth firms and firms with high volatility/uncertainty. Second, I turn to the conditional CAPM as a more conventional way to measure risk and its changes. Barinov (2009a) argues that one reason why growth firms and volatile firms have low expected returns is because they become less risky in recessions. In recessions, both aggregate volatility and idiosyncratic volatility increase, which means that the value of growth options becomes less sensitive to the value of the underlying asset and the growth options therefore become less risky precisely when risks are high. This effect is stronger for volatile firms. Hence, volatile firms and growth firms should have procyclical market betas. Barinov (2009a) confirms this prediction empirically using the conditional CAPM.
If sorting on volatility/uncertainty measures and market-to-book creates larger spreads in the sorting variables within the low IO subsample, I expect that the arbitrage portfolios exploiting the value effect, the idiosyncratic volatility discount, the turnover effect, and the analyst disagreement effect will have more countercyclical market betas in the low IO subsample. I estimate the conditional CAPM and show that this prediction is strongly supported by the data. Similarly, consistent with aggregate volatility risk being the explanation of the positive relation between IO and future returns, low (high) IO firms have procyclical (countercyclical) market betas, and this is especially true in the growth subsample and the high uncertainty subsample. However, consistent with the Lewellen and Nagel (2006) critique, the change in the betas of the arbitrage portfolios, while goes in the right direction, is too small to explain the anomalies in question, which points towards the ICAPM as the right model to explain the anomalies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources. Section 3 shows that institutional investors tend to avoid the firms with extreme levels of market-to-book and volatility, and demonstrates the consequent pattern in aggregate volatility risk exposure in double sorts on market-to-book/volatility and IO. Section 4 explains the relation between the anomalies and IO using the aggregate volatility risk factor. Section 5 uses aggregate volatility risk factor to explain both the positive relation between IO and future returns and why this relation is stronger for growth firms and high volatility/uncertainty firms. Section 6 performs the robustness checks, first, replacing the aggregate volatility risk factor by the change in expected aggregate volatility and, second, estimating conditional CAPM instead of the ICAPM. Section 7 concludes.
Data

Data Sources
The data in the paper come from CRSP, Compustat, IBES, Thompson Financial, and the CBOE indexes databases. The sample period is from January 1986 to December 2006. IO is the sum of institutional holdings from Thompson Financial 13F database, divided by the shares outstanding from CRSP. If the stock is on CRSP, but not on Thompson Financial 13F database, it is assumed to have zero IO. If the stock's capitalization is below the 20th NYSE/AMEX percentile, its IO is assumed to be missing. The results in the paper are robust to including in the sample the stocks from the bottom size quintile.
Following Nagel (2005) , in asset pricing tests I use residual IO to eliminate the tight link between size and IO and to make sure that I am not capturing any size effects. Residual IO is the residual from
fitted to all firms within each separate quarter.
In Section 4, I look at four anomalies: the value effect, the idiosyncratic volatility discount, the turnover effect, and the analyst disagreement effect. I measure the value effect as the return differential between the bottom and top market-to-book quintiles.
Market-to-book is market value of equity (Compustat item #25 times Compustat item #199) over the sum of book equity (Compustat item #60) and deferred taxes (Compustat item #74). The quintiles are rebalanced annually, and the market-to-book is always from the fiscal year ending no later than in June of the sorting year.
I define the idiosyncratic volatility discount as the return differential between the lowest and the highest idiosyncratic volatility quintile. Idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the standard deviation of residuals from the Fama-French model, fitted to the daily data for each month (at least 15 valid observations are required). The idiosyncratic volatility quintiles are formed using the previous month idiosyncratic volatility and are rebalanced monthly.
The turnover effect is the difference in returns between the firms with low turnover and high turnover. Turnover is measured monthly and averaged in each firm-year (at least 5 months with valid observations are required). NASDAQ (exchcd=3) turnover is divided by 2 to eliminate double-counting. The turnover quintiles are rebalanced annually.
The analyst disagreement effect is the return differential between the lowest and highest analyst disagreement quintile. Analyst disagreement is measured as the standard deviation of all outstanding earnings-per-share forecasts for the current fiscal year scaled by the absolute value of the average outstanding earnings forecast (zero-mean forecasts and forecasts by only one analyst excluded). Analyst disagreement is set to missing for the firms with stock price lower than $5. The data on analyst forecasts are from IBES.
My proxy for expected aggregate volatility is the old VIX index. It is calculated by CBOE and measures the implied volatility of one-month put and call options on S&P 100. To estimate the conditional CAPM in Section 6, I employ four commonly used conditioning variables: the dividend yield, the default premium, the risk-free rate, and the term premium. I define the dividend yield, (DIV t ), as the sum of dividend payments to all CRSP stocks over the previous 12 months, divided by the current value of the CRSP value-weighted index. I regress the daily changes in VIX on the daily excess returns to the six size and bookto-market portfolios (sorted in two groups on size and three groups on book-to-market).
The fitted part of this regression less the constant is the FVIX factor. I cumulate returns to the monthly level to get the monthly return to FVIX. All results in the paper are robust to changing the base assets from the six size and book-to-market portfolio to the ten industry portfolios (Fama and French, 1997) increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile, IO will decrease by −0.09 · (−50) = 4.5%.
However, the next column of the bottom left shows that the link between idiosyncratic volatility is more complicated, because, consistent with my hypothesis, after adding the squared volatility the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility becomes significantly positive, and the coefficient on its square comes out significantly negative. This is consistent with similar evidence reported in Falkenstein (1996) .
The values of the coefficients suggest that IO peaks at 0.367/(2 · 0.0048) = 38th idiosyncratic volatility percentile. At the 10th volatility percentile, IO reacts by a 0.367 − 2 · 0.0048 · 10 = 0.27% increase to the increase of idiosyncratic volatility by one percentile.
At the 90th volatility percentile, IO reacts by a 0.367 − 2 · 0.0048 · 90 = −0.5% decrease to the increase of idiosyncratic volatility by one percentile.
The results with idiosyncratic volatility replaced by analyst forecast dispersion (bottom right panel) are very similar. In the regressions with market-to-book I observe that IO peaks at the 15th market-to-book quintile, suggesting that institutions almost always prefer lower market-to-book levels, unless these levels are below the 15th percentile. In the regressions with turnover, the peak is at the 97th turnover quintile, meaning that institutions almost always prefer higher turnover to lower. This probably not surprising, because high turnover can mean both high liquidity and high disagreement, and institutions always prefer higher liquidity. While the relation between the disagreement part of turnover and IO may peak at intermediate values of turnover, the presence of the liquidity part will create the impression that turnover is almost always positively related with IO.
In Panel B of Table 1 To sum up, in this subsection I find that IO significantly increases in idiosyncratic volatility, market-to-book, turnover, and analyst disagreement if these variables are low, and significantly decreases in them if these variables are high. This implies that institutions prefer firms with intermediate values of idiosyncratic volatility, market-to-book, turnover, and analyst disagreement, and the low IO subsample will include the firms with both extremely high and extremely low levels of the four variables. Thus, sorting on any of these variables in the low IO subsample will create a wider spread in the values of this variable and, since all these variables are related to aggregate volatility risk (see Barinov, 2009a Barinov, , 2009b Barinov, , 2009c ), a wider spread in aggregate volatility risk. The wider spread in aggregate volatility risk makes it unsurprising that the value effect, the turnover effect, the idiosyncratic volatility discount, and the analyst disagreement effect are all stronger in the low IO subsample.
Aggregate Volatility Risk
In Table 2 , I perform double sorts on IO and market-to-book, as well as on IO and id-
iosyncratic volatility, to demonstrate more visibly how the correlation between IO and market-to-book (idiosyncratic volatility) changes its sign when market-to-book (idiosyncratic volatility) increases, and how this pattern is transformed into a similar pattern in exposure to aggregate volatility risk.
In the left part of Panel A I sort firms independently into five quintiles on IO and idiosyncratic volatility and report the median values of market-to-book for each portfolio (the medians are computed separately for each portfolio and each quarter and then averaged across quarters). I find that in the lowest market-to-book quintile, firms with the lowest level of IO have the median market-to-book that is by 8% lower than that of the firms with the highest level of IO. However, in the highest market-to-book quintile, firms with the lowest level of IO beat the firms with the highest level of IO by 19% in terms of median market-to-book. As a result, the market-to-book differential between value and growth firms is by 25% higher in the lowest IO quintile. All these differences are highly statistically significant.
In the right part of Panel A, I look at the FVIX betas in the same five-by-five sorts on IO and market-to-book. FVIX is my aggregate volatility factor that mimics daily changes in the VIX index, the implied volatility of S&P 100 options. The daily returns to the factor-mimicking portfolios are then cumulated to the monthly level. The FVIX betas in Table 2 In results not reported for brevity, I also look at the double sorts on IO and either turnover or analyst disagreement and obtain the same results in terms of the differentials in the FVIX betas and the median firm characteristics.
To sum up, Table 2 shows the change in the sign of the correlation between IO and market-to-book (idiosyncratic volatility) as market-to-book (idiosyncratic volatility) increases. The consequent wider differential in market-to-book (idiosyncratic volatility)
when the firms are sorted on market-to-book (idiosyncratic volatility) in the lower IO quintile corresponds to a similar wider differential in FVIX betas, which suggests that aggregate volatility risk can potentially explain why the value effect (the idiosyncratic volatility discount) is stronger in the low IO subsample. The same is true about the turnover effect and the analyst disagreement effect.
IO, Anomalies, and Aggregate Volatility Risk
In this subsection, I use the aggregate volatility risk factor (FVIX) to explain why four prominent anomalies -the value effect, the idiosyncratic volatility discount, the turnover effect, and the analyst disagreement effect -are stronger for the firms with low IO. Prior research (Barinov, 2009a (Barinov, , 2009b (Barinov, , 2009c shows that idiosyncratic volatility, market-to-book, turnover, and analyst disagreement are all negatively correlated with aggregate volatility risk, and this correlation explains their cross-sectional correlation with future returns (i.e., the anomalies in question). The story in this paper is that the anomalies are stronger in the low IO subsample, because institutions tend to avoid the firms with extremely low and extremely high levels of idiosyncratic volatility, market-to-book, turnover, or analyst disagreement. Hence, these firms end up in the low IO group, and sorting on either of the four variables in the low IO subsample creates a wider differential in the values of the sorting variable and, as a consequence, in aggregate volatility risk.
Value Effect
In Panel A of Table 3 , I start with looking at the value effect, defined as the difference in returns between the lowest and the highest market-to-book quintiles, in each IO quintile.
In the top two rows I confirm the result in Nagel (2005), who finds that the CAPM and Fama-French (1993) alphas of the value minus growth arbitrage portfolio are significantly larger in the lowest institutional quintile.
In the next pair of rows, I report the ICAPM alphas and the FVIX betas from the ICAPM. First, I find that adding the FVIX factor uniformly reduces the value effect in all IO quintiles by about two thirds compared to the CAPM alphas and makes it at most marginally significant. This evidence is consistent with Barinov (2009a) , who also finds that aggregate volatility risk can almost completely explain the value effect.
Second, I find that while the CAPM alphas of the value minus growth portfolios in the 
Idiosyncratic Volatility Discount
In Panel B of Table 3 , I look at the variation in the idiosyncratic volatility discount across IO quintiles. I define the idiosyncratic volatility discount as the return to the arbitrage portfolio long in the lowest idiosyncratic volatility quintile and short in the highest idiosyncratic volatility quintile (henceforth, the low minus high volatility portfolio).
In the top two rows I confirm the finding of Nagel (2005) 
Turnover Effect
In Panel C of Table 3 , I look at the turnover effect, defined as the difference in returns between the lowest and the highest turnover quintiles, in each IO quintile. In the top two rows I confirm the result in Nagel (2005) , who finds that the CAPM alphas and the The corresponding differential in FVIX betas is -2.345, t-statistic -5.98.
Analyst Disagreement Effect
Lastly, in Panel D of Table 3 analyst disagreement effect between low and high IO firms was particularly strong.
In the next two rows, I estimate the two-factor ICAPM with the market factor and FVIX for the low minus high disagreement portfolio formed separately in each IO quintile.
I find that, once I control for the FVIX factor, the difference in the analyst disagreement effect between the lowest and the highest IO quintile is only 2 bp per month, t-statistic 0.1. The FVIX factor is also able to explain the analyst disagreement effect in all IO quintiles, except for, probably, the highest quintile (t-statistic for the alpha is 1.88), which The second regularity is easier to explain. The results in the previous two sections show that in the subsample of firms with low market-to-book (volatility) institutions prefer firms with higher market-to-book (volatility) and, consequentially, lower aggregate volatility risk. In the subsample of firms with high market-to-book (volatility) the reverse is true:
institutions pick the stocks with lower market-to-book (volatility) and higher aggregate volatility risk. Hence, the strategy of buying high and shorting low IO firms will result in negative exposure to aggregate volatility risk in the low market-to-book or low volatility subsample, and in positive exposure to aggregate volatility risk in the high market-to-book or high volatility subsample. Based on the difference in aggregate volatility risk alone I would therefore predict that the return differential between high and low IO firms will become more positive as either market-to-book or volatility increase.
On average, IO can be positively related to future returns if the relation between it and aggregate volatility risk is weakly negative or zero in the low market-to-book/volatility subsample and strongly positive in the high market-to-book/volatility subsample. As Panels A2 and B2 of 
IO Effect
In Table 4 I report the alphas and the FVIX betas of the IO quintile portfolios. To control for the size effects, the portfolios are formed using NYSE (exchcd=1) breakpoints and residual IO (see Nagel, 2005 , and Section 2 of this paper for description). Using CRSP breakpoints makes the results stronger, using raw IO does not change them.
In 
IO Effect and Market-to-Book
In Panel A of Table 5 , I look at the IO effect on future returns across market-to-book quintiles. In each market-to-book quintile, I form an arbitrage portfolio that buys the However, Table 4 suggests that, contrary to the belief held in the literature, the IO effect does not mean stock picking ability of institutional investors. The puzzle is not why the stocks favored by institutional investors do so well -they do not, but why the stocks ignored by institutional investors underperform.
In untabulated results, I find that the increase of the IO effect with market-to-book is primarily driven by the deteriorating performance of low IO firms. The CAPM alpha of value firms with the lowest IO is 83 bp per month, t-statistic 2.68, compared to -69 bp per month, t-statistic -2.36 -the CAPM alpha of growth firms with the lowest IO. Moreover, the CAPM alpha of growth firms with the highest IO is only 25 bp per month, t-statistic 1.08. I conclude that the IO effect is stronger for growth firms not because institutional investors pick exceptionally good growth stocks, but because the growth stocks they ignore have abnormally low returns.
In Section 3, I show that institutional investors prefer value to growth, and this preference becomes more pronounced in the subsamples with higher market-to-book. Hence, as we move from value quintile to growth quintile, sorting stocks on IO creates a more and more negative sort on market-to-book (see Table 2 , Panel A1 for confirmation). Because for growth firms sorting on IO means more negative spread in market-to-book, the respective difference in aggregate volatility risk becomes more positive and the IO effect becomes stronger. Also, growth firms ignored by institutions are ignored because their market-to-book is too high even for the growth subsample. But the high market-to-book means very low aggregate volatility risk (large and positive FVIX beta), which explains why the CAPM alpha of growth stocks with low IO is so negative.
In the middle two rows of Panel A, Table 5 The FVIX betas of the low minus high IO portfolio show that buying high and shorting low IO firms becomes more profitable for the firms with higher market-to-book not because institutions are better in picking growth stocks, but because during increases in aggregate volatility this strategy trails the CAPM more severely if followed in the growth subsample.
The reason for this underperformance is that in the effort to stay away from growth stocks, institutions forego important hedges against aggregate volatility risk, and they do it more in the growth subsample, where their desire to avoid high market-to-book stocks is the strongest (see Table 1 and Panel A1 of Table 2 ).
In the last two rows of Panel A, Table 5 , I look at the alphas and FVIX betas from In Section 3, I show that institutional investors tend to prefer intermediate levels of volatility and ignore the stocks with extremely high and extremely low levels of volatility.
Therefore, as Panel B of Table 2 confirms, in the high volatility subsample, sorting on IO implies reverse sorting on volatility and, consequentially, direct sorting on aggregate volatility risk. Thus, my explanation of the relation between the IO effect and volatility and why this relation is mostly driven by the underperformance of volatile stocks ignored by institutional investors, is the following: in the high volatility subsample, institutions tend to ignore the stocks with high levels of volatility and extremely high hedging ability against aggregate volatility risk. In the low volatility subsample they behave in the opposite way, and as a result in cross-section the exposure of the portfolio long in the highest and short in the lowest IO quintile to aggregate volatility risk increases with volatility.
In the middle rows of Panels B to D, Table 5 IO stocks beat low IO stocks not because institutional investors can pick future winnersthey cannot, but because they ignore firms with extreme levels of volatility and consequent high ability to hedge against aggregate volatility risk, and these firms have low expected returns.
Robustness Checks
In this section, I perform two robustness checks of my main results. First, I replace FVIX by the change in VIX, which is the variable FVIX mimics, and check if this direct test confirms that the anomalies I look at (the value effect, the idiosyncratic volatility discount, the turnover effect, and the analyst disagreement effect) are indeed stronger for low IO firms because exploiting the anomalies means greater losses when aggregate volatility increases.
I also use the change in VIX instead of FVIX to confirm that the positive relation between IO and future returns, as well as the increase in strength of this relation for growth firms and volatile firms are due to aggregate volatility risk.
Second, I look at the conditional CAPM and show that all return patterns described in the previous paragraph can be partly explained by the fact that the betas of the portfolios that try to exploit these patterns are countercyclical. To put it differently, the betas of the firms with high levels of volatility or growth options and low levels of IO tend to decrease sharply during recessions, which leads to the smaller increase in expected returns of these firms and the smaller loss of value compared to the firms with similar market betas.
The tests in this section use five arbitrage portfolios. The first portfolio, Inst, buys the firms from the top IO quintile and shorts the firms from the bottom IO quintile. 
Aggregate Volatility Exposure
In Table 6 , I regress daily returns to the five arbitrage portfolios (Inst, Inst MB, Inst IVol, Inst Turn, and Inst Disp) on the market factor and either the change in VIX (the leftmost column) or the FVIX factor (the second left column). I choose the daily frequency because at this frequency VIX is closer to the random walk, and therefore its change is a better proxy for the innovation in expected aggregate volatility, which is the variable of interest in the ICAPM context. I reestimate the ICAPM for daily returns to make sure that my results in the previous sections are robust to the change in the observation frequency. I also use both equal-weighted (left panel of Table 6 ) and value-weighted (right panel) returns.
The second left column with daily FVIX betas shows that changing the observation frequency from monthly to daily does not impact the results reported in the previous sections. All daily FVIX betas are negative, economically large, statistically significant, and reasonably close to the monthly FVIX betas. For example, the daily FVIX beta of the Inst Disp portfolio (equal-weighted returns, left panel of Table 6 ) is -0.713, t-statistic -12.5, and its monthly FVIX beta (Table 3 , Panel D) is -0.788, t-statistic -8.17.
The leftmost column of both panels in Table 6 shows that in almost all cases one can replace FVIX by the change in VIX it mimics, and slope on the change in VIX will have the same sign and remain statistically significant. The only exception is the Inst IVol portfolio, which has an insignificantly positive loading on change in VIX in both equal-weighted and value-weighted returns. Also, in equal-weighted returns the Inst portfolio has zero loading on the VIX change, but the loading is reliably negative in value-weighted returns. In all other cases, the sign of the exposure to the VIX change is negative and significant in both columns.
Overall, the leftmost column shows significant exposure to innovations in expected aggregate volatility for all but one (Inst IVol) portfolios. Hence, the existence of the IO effect, its positive relation with market-to-book, turnover, and analyst forecast dispersion, as well as the positive relation between IO and the value effect, the turnover effect, and the analyst disagreement effect, can be explained by the fact that the portfolios trying to exploit these returns patterns significantly underperform the CAPM when expected aggregate volatility unexpectedly increases.
The magnitude of the slopes on the VIX changes seems to suggest that the impact of aggregate volatility on the arbitrage portfolios is moderate. VIX values are around 15 in expansions and can be over 40 in recessions 5 . Most slopes on the VIX change fall between -0.015 and -0.035, which implies that the arbitrage portfolios in Table 6 will underperform the CAPM by at most 50-120 bp as the economy goes all the way from expansion to recession. However, the regression of the market factor on the VIX change also yields a low, but highly significant coefficient of -0.13, implying that the market should drop by about 4% during recessions. I attribute the low coefficients to the fact that VIX can be a noisy estimate of the true expected aggregate volatility. This is supported by the evidence that FVIX betas have much higher t-statistics than the loadings on the VIX change.
In the two right columns, I report the slopes from pairwise regressions of the five arbitrage portfolios on the change in VIX or the FVIX factor (with the market factor omitted) to underscore the conditional nature of my results: I do not argue that when aggregate volatility increases, low IO firms or growth firms with low IO gain or that they beat high IO firms or value firms with low IO. All I show is that when aggregate volatility increases, low IO firms or growth firms with low IO, or other similar sort of firms perform
significantly better than what the CAPM predicts.
Most loadings on FVIX and the VIX change in the two right columns are indeed either insignificant or have the wrong sign, confirming that firms with low IO, as well as growth firms and high uncertainty firms with low IO, do not offer positive returns when aggregate volatility increases. Their returns in these periods are simply not as bad as the CAPM leads us to predict, hence their risk is lower than what the CAPM says, and this is the explanation of why these types of firms have negative alphas.
Conditional CAPM
In this subsection, I corroborate the previous results with the FVIX factor and the VIX change using the conditional CAPM. Prior research (Barinov, 2009a (Barinov, , 2009b (Barinov, , 2009c shows that firms with abundant growth options and high levels of firm-specific uncertainty beat the CAPM when expected aggregate volatility increases. This effect has two causes. First, all else equal, the value of growth options, especially if the underlying asset is volatile, increases with volatility. Second, the beta of growth options decreases when uncertainty about the underlying asset increases, which usually happens simultaneously with increases in aggregate volatility (see Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu, 2001, and Barinov, 2009c).
In recessions, the decrease in the beta mutes the increase in expected returns and makes the corresponding value loss smaller.
In Section 3, I show that sorting on market-to-book and measures of firm uncertainty produces a wider spread in these measures in the low IO subsample, because institutions tend to avoid holding stocks with extreme levels of market-to-book and uncertainty. Therefore, while prior research (Barinov, 2009a (Barinov, , 2009b (Barinov, , 2009c ) predicts that value minus growth portfolio, as well as the low minus high uncertainty portfolio, has countercyclical market betas (higher in bad times), I extend this prediction by arguing that these portfolios will have more countercyclical betas if formed in the low IO subsample, which partly explains why the value effect, the idiosyncratic volatility discount, the turnover effect, and the analyst disagreement effect are stronger in the low IO subsample. The flip side of this prediction is that the Inst portfolio will have more countercyclical betas if formed in the subsample of firms with high market-to-book or high uncertainty, and on average the betas of the Inst portfolio are countercyclical, which can potentially explain its positive alpha.
In Table 7 , I estimate the conditional CAPM betas of the five arbitrage portfolios (Inst, Inst MB, Inst IVol, Inst Turn, Inst Disp) by running the regression
where DIV t is dividend yield of the CRSP value-weighted index over the past twelve months, DEF t is the default premium, defined as the difference in yields between Aaa and Baa corporate bonds, T B t is the one-month Treasury bill rate, and T ERM t is the term premium, defined as the yield differential between ten-year and one-year Treasury bonds.
I define the conditional beta as
In Table 7 , I report the values of the conditional beta from (3) in recessions and expansions, along with the difference between the two, for the five arbitrage portfoliosInst, Inst MB, Inst IVol, Inst Turn, and Inst Disp (the definitions are in the beginning of the section). I define recessions as the months when the expected market risk premium is above its in-sample median. The rest of the sample is labeled expansion. I estimate the expected market risk premium from
I expect the conditional betas of all portfolios to increase in recessions (which would mean positive values in the Diff column in Table 7 ), if the risk shift is a potential explanation of the stronger value effect, the stronger idiosyncratic volatility discount, the stronger turnover effect, and the stronger analyst disagreement effect for low IO firms, as well as a potential explanation of the IO effect and its positive dependence on market-to-book and uncertainty.
The Diff column in Table 7 indeed shows that both in equal-weighted and valueweighted returns the betas of all five arbitrage portfolio increase during recessions, contributing to the explanation of the positive alphas of these portfolios. All differences in betas are positive and significant. However, consistent with the Lewellen and Nagel (2006) critique, their magnitude ranges between 0.05 and 0.2, implying that even if the risk premium increases during recessions by 1% per month, the change in betas can explain 5 bp to 20 bp per month of the portfolio alphas, whereas the alphas range between 50 bp and 100 bp per month (see Table 3 and Table 4 ). The consequent inability of the conditional CAPM to explain the returns to the five arbitrage portfolios in Table 7 is further confirmed by the conditional CAPM alphas (not reported to save space), which decline by 10-15 bp compared to the unconditional CAPM alphas and remain significant.
The bottom line of the subsection is that the risk of the five arbitrage portfolios indeed moves in the predicted direction, thus partly explaining why firms with low IO and firms with high levels of uncertainty and market-to-book coupled with low IO beat the CAPM when aggregate volatility increases. However, the change in risk is insufficient to explain the magnitude of the returns to the five arbitrage portfolios, thus suggesting that one should abandon the conditional CAPM in favor of the ICAPM in explaining the stronger value effect, the stronger idiosyncratic volatility discount, the stronger turnover effect, and the stronger analyst disagreement effect for low IO firms, as well as the IO effect and why it is stronger for growth firms and high uncertainty firms.
Conclusion
The paper shows that aggregate volatility risk explains why several anomalies -the value effect, the idiosyncratic volatility discount, the turnover effect, and the analyst disagreement effect -are stronger for the firms with low IO. I document that institutional investors tend to ignore both the firms with extremely low levels of market-to-book and uncertainty (measured by either idiosyncratic volatility, or turnover, or analyst forecast dispersion) and the firms with extremely high levels of market-to-book and uncertainty. Institutional investors realize that they need some firm-specific uncertainty in their holdings to benefit from their comparative advantage in obtaining and processing information, and therefore they are reluctant to hold the stocks with very low levels of market-to-book, idiosyncratic volatility, turnover, and analyst disagreement. However, portfolio managers also tend to steer clear of the firms with high levels of volatility/uncertainty, because they cannot diversify away the impact of idiosyncratic risk on their compensation. Therefore, the firms with extreme levels of market-to-book, idiosyncratic volatility, turnover, and analyst disagreement are over-represented in the low IO subsample, and sorting on these variables in the low IO subsample creates a wider spread in these variables and, consequently, in aggregate volatility risk 6 .
I find that the ICAPM with the market factor and the aggregate volatility risk factor (the FVIX factor) can explain more than 50% of the decrease in the magnitude of the four anomalies with IO, and the unexplained part is usually insignificant. I use both the FVIX factor, which is the factor-mimicking portfolio for the change in VIX, and the change in VIX itself to show that when aggregate volatility increases, the strategy that buys low and shorts high uncertainty firms trails the CAPM more severely if followed in the subsample of low IO firms. I also use the conditional CAPM to show that the market betas of this strategy increase more during recessions in the low IO subsample. show empirically that the two-factor ICAPM with the market factor and the FVIX factor indeed explains why the IO effect is stronger for growth firms and high uncertainty firms.
I also use the change in VIX directly to show that when aggregate volatility increases, low IO firms beat high IO firms with similar market betas in the growth subsample and the high uncertainty subsample, but do not do so in the value subsample and the low uncertainty subsample. Moreover, the conditional market betas of the high minus low IO portfolio increase in recessions only in the growth subsample and the high uncertainty subsample.
I also find that positive exposure of the high minus low IO portfolio to aggregate volatility risk in the growth/high uncertainty subsample is much larger than the negative exposure of the same portfolio in the value/low uncertainty subsample. Hence, on average buying high IO firms and shorting low IO firms implies bearing aggregate volatility risk, which turns out to be sufficient to explain the positive alpha of this strategy. I also find that the positive cross-sectional relation between IO and future returns is driven exclusively by the negative alphas of the low IO firms, which is consistent with and successfully explained by the aggregate volatility risk story, but is inconsistent with the view of the positive cross-sectional relation between IO and future returns as the evidence that institutions have superior stock picking ability. IO is the sum of institutional holdings from Thompson Financial 13F database, divided by the shares outstanding from CRSP and reported in percentage. If the stock is on CRSP, but not on Thompson Financial 13F database, it is assumed to have zero IO. If the stock's capitalization is below the 20th NYSE/AMEX percentile, its IO is assumed to be missing.
Market-to-book is defined as market value of equity (Compustat item #25 times Compustat item #199) divided by book equity (Compustat item #60) plus deferred taxes (Compustat item #74). Turnover is trading volume divided by shares outstanding (both from CRSP). Turnover is measured monthly and averaged in each firm-year (at least 5 months with valid observations are required). NASDAQ (exchcd=3) turnover is divided by 2 to eliminate double-counting.
Idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the standard deviation of residuals from the FamaFrench model, fitted to the daily data for each month (at least 15 valid observations are required). Analyst disagreement is measured as the standard deviation of all outstanding earnings-per-share forecasts for the current fiscal year scaled by the absolute value of the average outstanding earnings forecast (zero-mean forecasts and forecasts by only one analyst excluded). Analyst disagreement is set to missing for the firms with stock price lower than $5.
The regressions also use the conventional controls: size, age, membership in the S&P500 index, stock price, cumulative returns in the past three months, cumulative return between month -4 and month -12, and dividend yield. All variables are percentage ranks and are computed before the start of the period for which IO is reported.
The breakpoint percentile at the bottom of each panel is the percentile of the corresponding independent variable, after which its slope changes from positive to negative.
The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) The table presents Table 3 . IO, Anomalies, and Aggregate Volatility Risk
The table reports the alphas and the FVIX betas for the several anomalous arbitrage portfolios formed separately within each IO quintile. The following models are used for measuring the alphas and betas: the CAPM, the Fama-French model, the CAPM augmented with FVIX (ICAPM), and the Fama-French model augmented with FVIX (FF4). FVIX is the factor-mimicking portfolio that tracks the daily changes in VIX, the implied volatility of one-month options on S&P 100.
The arbitrage portfolio in Panel A buys the stocks in the lowest market-to-book quintile and shorts the stocks with the highest market-to-book quintiles. The arbitrage portfolio in Panel B, (C, D) does the same with extreme idiosyncratic volatility (turnover, analyst forecast dispersion) quintiles.
All quintiles, including the IO quintiles, use NYSE (exchcd=1) breakpoints. Market-tobook and turnover quintiles are rebalanced annually, IO quintiles are rebalanced quarterly, idiosyncratic volatility and analyst disagreement quintiles are rebalanced monthly. The definition of all variables is in the heading of The table reports the alphas and the FVIX betas of the arbitrage portfolio that buys the highest and shorts the lowest IO quintile. This arbitrage portfolio is formed separately in each market-to-book quintile (Panel A), each idiosyncratic volatility quintile (Panel B), each turnover quintile (Panel C), and each analyst disagreement quintile (Panel D). All quintiles use NYSE (exchcd=1) breakpoints. Market-to-book and turnover quintiles are rebalanced annually, IO quintiles are rebalanced quarterly, idiosyncratic volatility and analyst disagreement quintiles are rebalanced monthly. The definition of all variables is in the heading of Table 1 . The following models are used for measuring the alphas and betas: the CAPM, the Fama-French model, the CAPM augmented with FVIX (ICAPM), and the Fama-French model augmented with FVIX (FF4). FVIX is the factor-mimicking portfolio that tracks the daily changes in VIX, the implied volatility of one-month options on S&P 100. The t-statistics use Newey-West (1987) Table 6 . IO, Anomalies, and Aggregate Volatility Exposure
The table reports the sensitivity to aggregate volatility changes of the anomalous arbitrage portfolios. The sensitivity is measured by estimating the following regressions:
Inst is the portfolio long in the highest and short in the lowest IO quintile. Other portfolios measure the difference in the Inst portfolio returns between the highest and the lowest quintiles of the variables mentioned in their name. For example, Inst Turn is the return differential between the Inst portfolio formed in the highest turnover quintile and the Inst portfolio formed in the lowest turnover quintile. The detailed description of the variables is in the header of Table 7 . IO, Anomalies, and Conditional CAPM
The table reports conditional CAPM betas across different states of the world for the arbitrage portfolio long in the highest and short in the lowest IO quintile (Inst portfolio), as well as the conditional CAPM betas of the arbitrage portfolios that measure the difference in the value effect (Inst MB), the difference in the idiosyncratic volatility discount (Inst IVol), the difference in the turnover effect (Inst Turn), and the difference in the analyst disagreement effect (Inst Disp) between the lowest and the highest IO quintiles. The detailed description of the variables is in the header of Table 1 .
Recession (Expansion) is defined as the period when the expected market risk premium is higher (lower) than its in-sample median. The expected risk premiums and the conditional betas are assumed to be linear functions of dividend yield, default spread, one-month Treasury bill rate, and term premium. The left panel presents the results with equal-weighted returns, and the right panel looks at value-weighted returns. The standard errors reported use Newey-West (1987) correction for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The sample period is from January 1986 to December 2006. 
